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defendant intended to extort ransom; (2) the restraint of the
victim lasted more than twelve hours and was for the purpose of
physically injurying him, or terrifying him, or of advancing the
commission of a felony or of interferring with a governmental
function; or (3) the victim died during the restraint. N.Y. REv.
PENAL LAw § 135.25.
I The Model Penal Code published by the American
Law Institute
foreshadowed the changes recently made by the New York legislature. The Institute urged legislatures to reform their kidnapping
-statutes to prevent abusive prosecution for kidnapping. MoDEL
PENAL CoDE § 212.1, comment (Tent. Draft No. 11, 1960). The
model kidnapping statute requires that the victim be held for a
substantial period of time for the purpose of either (1) ransom,
(2) furthering the commission of a felony, (3) injuring or terrorizing the victim or (4) interfering with a governmental function.
It is further provided that kidnapping is a first degree felony
only when the victim is not released alive in a safe place prior to
trial. MODEL PENAL CODE, § 212.1 (Tent. Draft No. 11, 1960).
These statutes eliminate the difficult problem encountered in
the Knowles, Jacobs and principal cases. Whether courts in other
states will have to wrestle with this problem must be answered
by the legislators or prosecutors in the respective states. As Justice
Carter pointed out in the Knowles case, the question should not
be answered by the prosecutors.
Forrest Hansbury Roles

Domestic Relations-Married Woman's Domicile
H, a resident of Texas, married W, a resident of West Virginia.
After four years of marriage, W returned to West Virginia on
December 26 and seven days later brought suit for divorce on
grounds of cruelty. H moved that the action be dismissed for
lack of jurisdiction. H contended that neither he nor W met the
residence requirements of the West Virginia Code. The trial court
overruled H's motion and granted the divorce. H appealed. Held,
reversed. According to the West Virginia Code, when a suit for
divorce is not based on adultry, one of the parties must have been
a bona fide resident of the state for at least one year prior to the
institution of the suit. When a woman marries, the domicile of
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her husband automatically becomes her legal domicile. A party
can have but one domicile; therefore, W lost her domicile in West
Virginia when she married. When W returned to West Virginia
she was here seven days; therefore, she could not meet the one
year requirement of the West Virginia Code. The Circuit Court
of Lincoln County did not have jurisdiction to grant her a divorce.
Tate v. Tate, 142 S.E.2d 751 (W. Va. 1965).
According to a general common law rule a married woman's
domicile is the same as her husband's. At common law this rule
was based on the theory that when a woman married she and
her husband became one in the eyes of the law. Her legal existence
was suspended during marriage or at least incorporated into that
of her husband. Shute v. Sargent, 67 N.H. 305, 36 AtI. 282 (1893).
An exception to this general rule has developed in most jurisdictions; for purposes of divorce a wife may establish a domicile
separate from her husband's. By 1869 the United States Supreme
Court recognized this divorce exception. Cheever v. Wilson, 76
U.S. (9 Wall.) 108 (1870). In Carty v. Carty, 70 W. Va. 146, 73
S.E. 310 (1911), the West Virginia Supreme Court recognized
this divorce exception when it held that a wife could establish
a separate domicile in West Virginia for purposes of obtaining a
divorce although her husband was domiciled in Ohio. This exception to the common law rule is now so well settled as to be
assumed without discussion in many cases. Annot., 39 A.L.R. 710
(1925). See also Colson, West Virginia Divorce Law, 43 W. VA.
L. lrv. 120 (1936).

In the principal case it was not disputed that W had once been
domiciled in West Virginia; therefore to determine that she could
not maintain her suit it was first necessary to demonstrate that she
had lost that domicile. W contended that because H had moved
from place to place, he had failed to establish any matrimonial
domicile and she retained her West Virginia domicile. This contention is reminiscent of Berlingieri v. Berlingieri, 372 Ill. 60,
22 N.E.2d 675 (1939). In that case the wife had been domiciled
in Illinois prior to her marriage to a man described by the Illinois
Supreme Court as an international itinerant. The husband had
failed to establish a permanent domicile; therefore, the wife's
domicile could not shift to that of her husband. In the principal
case the general common law rule was emphasized in order to
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol68/iss1/10
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dispose of W's contention that her marriage had not affected her
West Virginia domicile. The essential points were that H was not
domiciled in West Virginia and W's domicile had followed his.
Concerning W's contention that no marital domicile had been
established, apparently the West Virginia Supreme Court accepted
the evidence that H was, "a citizen of Texas...."
After determining that W had lost her prior domicile in West Virginia, it was necessary to determine whether her seven day return
was sufficient to confer divorce jurisdiction on the West Virginia
courts.
WEST VIRGI-A CODE ch. 48, art. 2, § 8(b) (Michie 1961) sets
out two requirements concerning jurisdiction in divorce suits. No
such suit shall be brought unless (1) one of the parties at the
institution of the suit is a honda fide resident of West Virginia, and
(2) that residence has continued for at least one year preceding
institution of the suit. As pointed out in the principal case, residence and domicile are synonymous as used in divorce statutes.
Both of these code requirements must be met to confer jurisdiction.
It was apparent that W's seven day return did not fulfill the one
year time requirement; therefore, it was unnecessary to consider
whether that return satisfied the first requirement of section eight
(b). In order words, it was unnecessary to determine whether a
married woman could establish a separate domicile in West Virginia for divorce purposes.

Persons not familiar with this area of the law must be careful
not to confuse the reasoning in the principal case. One not aware
of the divorce exception could make the mistake of thinking W
failed to meet the first requirement of section eight (b), i.e., that
she was without the power to establish a separate domicile. This
is not the law; the divorce exception was recognized in West
Virginia in 1911. Carty v. Carty, supra.
In the principal case why was the general rule discussed so
thoroughly and the divorce exception not mentioned? The reason
the general rule was discussed was to dispose of W's contention
that the marriage had not affected her West Virginia domicile.
The reason the divorce exception was not discussed was that the
case could be decided without applying that exception.
W probably did establish a domicile by virtue of her seven day
return. In fact the West Virginia Supreme Court assumed this
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arguendo. "[S]he left the place where she and her husband were
living . . . and again became a resident of Lincoln County...
No basis for this assumption was expressed.
Lynne Ward Rexroad

Estate Tax-The Marital Deduction and Powers of Appointment
The decedent devised property in trust to pay the income to
his wife and son for their lives with a power in the wife to consume
the corpus if necessary for their combined support and maintenance. The will provided for a remainder over after the death of
the wife and son. The estate took the devised property as a
marital deduction. The Commissioner of Internal Revenue ruled
that the wife's interest was not a life estate with a power of
appointment that would qualify for the marital deduction. Held,
ruling affirmed.
The court held that the interest passing under the will did not
qualify for the marital deduction because the wife did not have a
power of appointment over a specific portion of the property and
the wife's power was not exercisable by her in all events. Even
if the wife had a life estate with a power of disposal as allowed
by West Virginia statute, her interest was something less than a
life estate with a power to appoint to herself or to her estate
and thus would not qualify for the marital deduction. Flesher v.
United States, 238 F.Supp. 119 (N.D. W. Va. 1965).
The marital deduction of the Federal Estate Tax law allows a
testator to devise up to 50%of his adjusted gross estate to a surviving spouse without incurring estate tax liability on that amount.
INr. REv. CODE oF 1954, § 2056. One type of devise which will
qualify for the marital deduction is a gift of a life estate with a
general power of appointment to the surviving spouse. INT. R .
CODE or 1954, § 2056(b) (5). A marital deduction is allowed if
the surviving spouse's life estate contains the following features:
the surviving spouse must be entitled to the entire income from
her interest in the corpus for life; the income must be payable
annually or at more frequent intervals; the power must be exercised by the surviving spouse alone and in all events; the interest
cannot be subject to a power of appointment in anyone else but
the surviving spouse; and the surviving spouse must have the power
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